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ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
WHEN EFFICIENCY TRUMPS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. O’Daniel1 
(decided October 21, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of accused persons to retain counsel for their de-
fense, while not firmly rooted in our common law heritage, is of great 
significance to the preservation of liberty.2  Still, nowhere in the lan-
guage of the Sixth Amendment can a reader find an express right re-
garding choice of counsel.  However, as the United States Supreme 
Court held in 1932 when deciding the seminal case of Powell v. Ala-
bama, it is now “hardly necessary” to point out that a criminal de-
fendant needs to be granted a fair opportunity to retain counsel of his 
or her own choice.3 
In New York, non-indigent criminal defendants facing a sen-
tence of imprisonment retain a qualified constitutional right to repre-
sentation by their counsel of choice, and as such must be permitted an 
opportunity to choose and retain counsel for their defense.4  And, be-
cause the choice of attorney in a criminal proceeding can be critical 
to a successful defense, it has been deemed to constitute a fundamen-
tal right provided by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution.5  However, not giving the accused an ample opportunity to 
hire and consult with his or her chosen attorney produces outcomes 
 
1 21 N.E.3d 209 (N.Y. 2014) [hereinafter O’Daniel 2]. 
2 Crooker v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958). 
3 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (emphasis added). 
4 People v. O’Daniel, 963 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2013) [hereinafter 
O’Daniel 1]; Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 156, 159 (1988). 
5 People v. Arroyave, 401 N.E.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 1980); U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. 
CONST. art. 1, § 6; “It is hardly necessary to say that . . . a defendant should be afforded a fair 
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 
(1932).  However, the right to counsel of choice is “circumscribed in several important re-
spects.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. 
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where the right to counsel is just short of worthless.6 
On April 11, 2013, in People v. O’Daniel, New York’s high-
est court upheld the Clinton County Court’s decision to deny William 
O’Daniel this constitutionally-granted right by invoking “[t]he effi-
cient administration of the criminal justice system” and, in doing so, 
endorsed the decision that required him to go to trial with counsel not 
of his choosing.7  That decision, efficient as it may have been, was 
arguably not constitutionally permissible.8  The purpose of this Note 
is to scrutinize the facts surrounding the conviction of William 
O’Daniel and to examine whether—as the Chief Judge of New 
York’s Court of Appeals has concluded—Mr. O’Daniel’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel of his choosing was violated.  Ultimate-
ly, this Note concludes that the decision by the trial court to force 
William O’Daniel to trial was a structural defect of the sort that 
should have required an automatic reversal of his conviction and a 
new trial, regardless of the strength of the evidence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts of the Case 
Finding himself faced with a myriad of serious criminal 
charges, William O’Daniel retained defense counsel.9  When he was 
retained, O’Daniel’s attorney, James Martineau Jr., was ailing from a 
debilitating medical condition.10  As the case progressed, two ad-
journments were requested due to Martineau’s poor health;11 in 
March 2010, Martineau’s condition worsened due to a “flare-up,” 
and, in April of the same year, a second adjournment request on med-
ical grounds was made following Martineau’s hospitalization.12  Dur-
ing the April request, the defense mentioned that “if adjournment 
were problematic for County Court then he would ‘advise his client 
 
6 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954). 
7 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 211-12. 
8 Id. at 214 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
9 Id. at 210.  O’Daniel was charged with “two counts of rape in the first degree, one count 
of attempted rape in the first degree, two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, and two 
counts of endangering the welfare of a child.” Id. 
10 Id. 
11 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 210. 
12 Id. 
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and assist him in attempting to obtain substitute counsel in an effort 
to move this matter along.’”13  At the behest of Clinton County Court, 
a second chair, Keith Bruno, was chosen in advance of the resched-
uled trial date by Martineau to take over if his health deteriorated fur-
ther.14  In the fall of 2010, just before trial was set to begin, Marti-
neau’s health took a turn for the worse.15  From there, the defendant’s 
file was sent to Bruno’s office, and he and O’Daniel met the follow-
ing day.16 
A week before the trial was set to start, Bruno moved to ad-
journ the trial date on behalf of the defendant.17  The reasoning pre-
sented to the court was that O’Daniel believed “that the legal system . 
. . was being unfair to him because of Martineau’s health.”18  Bruno 
also informed the court that he had “‘reviewed defendant’s entire file’ 
and was ‘confident’ that, should the motion be denied, he would ‘be 
prepared and ready to go forward to trial’ the following week,” add-
ing that he told O’Daniel that the court had an “obligation to move 
matters along in a timely fashion.”19  That request, opposed by the 
People, was denied.20 
Subsequently, on the day the trial was set to begin, a second 
request for postponement was made by Bruno on behalf of the de-
fendant, based specifically on the fact that O’Daniel’s retained coun-
sel, Martineau, was disabled and unable to assist him at trial.21  Bruno 
informed the court that O’Daniel, “from his perspective, [was] of the 
opinion that we need more time to prepare for the trial.”22  Again the 
People opposed the defendant’s request, and the court denied the mo-
tion, finding that “Bruno had not indicated ‘that he is unable to pro-
ceed directly’ or ‘that he is in need of extra time with regard to a spe-
 
13 Id. (internal brackets omitted).  
14 O’Daniel 1, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 740. 
15 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 210. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (internal brackets omitted). 
19 Id. 
20 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 210. 
21 Id. at 212-13.  See also N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 321(c) (McKinney 2015) (“If an attorney dies, 
becomes physically or mentally incapacitated, or is removed, suspended or otherwise be-
comes disabled at any time before judgment, no further proceeding shall be taken in the ac-
tion against the party for whom he appeared, without leave of the court, until thirty days after 
notice to appoint another attorney has been served upon that party either personally or in 
such manner as the court directs.”). 
22 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 210. 
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cific need to prepare in some specific way.’”23  Jury selection began 
that same day, followed by a trial that ended in the conviction and 
sentencing of William O’Daniel.24  An appeal followed.25 
B. Supreme Court, Appellate Division 
The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third 
Department, affirmed the decision of County Court.26  Regarding 
O’Daniel’s assertion that he was without the assistance of counsel at 
a pretrial conference,27 the court observed that, even though Bruno, 
not Martineau, appeared on the defendant’s behalf at the conference, 
“Bruno . . . indicated that he had reviewed defendant’s ‘entire file’ 
and discussed ‘at length’ . . . the terms of the People’s pending offer . 
. . [and] the ‘potential consequences of going to trial . . . .’”28  As 
such, the court regarded the claim as “patently meritless.”29 
O’Daniel’s next claims—that he was unable to go forward 
with counsel of his choosing, that the court interfered with a standing 
attorney/client relationship, and that the court abused its discretion 
when refusing to grant an additional adjournment—were found by 
the court to be equally unpersuasive.30  “[N]oticeably absent from the 
record is any indication that defendant was unwilling to proceed to 
trial with Bruno as counsel or . . . that he sought further adjournment 
of the trial date for the express purpose of retaining another attor-
ney.”31  To the contrary, the court noted, “Bruno indicated . . . that he 
had reviewed defendant’s ‘entire file,’ met with [O’Daniel] ‘quite 
frequently’ and was ‘confident’ that, if the trial proceeded as sched-
uled, he would be ‘prepared and ready to go forward.’”32 
An additional claim that O’Daniel was denied effective assis-
tance of counsel was also found to be without merit.33  Satisfied that 
 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 211. 
26 Id. 
27 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10(3) (McKinney 2010) (“The defendant has the right 
to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action.”). 
28 O’Daniel 1, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 740. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 O’Daniel 1, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 741. 
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O’Daniel received “meaningful representation,” the court referred to 
the trial record, which indicated that Bruno’s opening and closing 
statements were “cogent,” that his cross-examination of the People’s 
witnesses was “effective,” that he “made appropriate objections” 
throughout the trial, and presented a “viable–albeit unsuccessful–
defense.”34  The last claim the court considered was that the underly-
ing verdict was against the weight of the evidence.35  After discussing 
the trial testimony and the evidence presented, the court ultimately 
deferred to the decision made by the jury, discerning no basis on 
which to disturb their determination.36 
In its holding, the court conceded that criminal defendants 
have a “constitutional right to be represented by counsel of their 
choosing and must be accorded an opportunity to select and retain 
such counsel.”37  In finding no error with respect to choice, the opin-
ion focused on the fact that the right to choose is not without qualifi-
cation; a defendant may not exercise this right with the goal of delay-
ing a judicial proceeding, which is what the Third Department 
concluded O’Daniel was attempting to accomplish38 
C. Court of Appeals of New York 
1. The Majority 
Upon being denied relief by the state Supreme Court, 
O’Daniel pursued his appeal and was granted leave by the Court of 
Appeals of New York in 2014.39  Basing its decision on the premise 
that O’Daniel’s adjournment requests were meant to delay justice 
(and not meant to exercise his constitutionally-guaranteed right of 
proceeding with counsel of his choosing), the court, in a 6-1 decision, 
affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.40 
In its decision, the majority opinion framed the question pre-
sented as whether Clinton County Court was responsible to inquire 
whether the defendant was actually seeking new counsel when re-
 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 740. 
38 O’Daniel 1, 963 N.Y.S.2d at 740. 
39 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 211. 
40 Id. at 211-12. 
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questing an adjournment.41  The holding specified that denials of such 
motions are not unconstitutional solely because they are not accom-
panied by an inquiry relative to a defendant seeking new counsel.42  
The lower court’s decision was affirmed when the Court of Appeals 
concluded that O’Daniel was not in fact seeking new counsel, nor 
was he requesting an adjournment with hope that the health of Marti-
neau—his sole retained legal counsel—would improve quickly.43  
Limiting the analysis to only that which was addressed by the majori-
ty’s holding, the efficient administration of criminal justice, may 
seem to lend itself to upholding the conviction; however, as then-
New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Lipmann explained, Wil-
liam O’Daniel’s fundamental and constitutional rights were violat-
ed.44 
2. The Dissent 
Chief Judge Lippman’s dissent in People v. O’Daniel took is-
sue with considerations made by the majority, as well as the Third 
Department.  He pointed out that Bruno was “never substituted for 
Martineau, or even retained as co-counsel by defendant,” and that the 
trial court, which was primarily responsible for Bruno’s becoming 
trial counsel, “knew that Mr. Bruno was not appearing at defendant’s 
behest but at the request of Mr. Martineau to accommodate the trial 
court’s concern with Standards and Goals.”45  Chief Judge Lipmann 
went on to say that O’Daniel’s actions could have left “no doubt that 
defendant was invoking his right to be represented by an attorney of 
his choosing.”46  He came to this conclusion based on the substance 
of a motion filed by O’Daniel pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L.R. section 
321(c).47  This civil statute calls for a thirty-day stay of all proceed-
ings against a party whose attorney becomes disabled so as to permit 
the party to retain other counsel.48  Everyone involved understood 
Martineau to be disabled, and Bruno reiterated to the trial court, upon 
filing the motion, that Martineau, not he, was O’Daniel’s retained 
 
41 Id. at 212. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 214 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
45 Id. at 212. 
46 Id. at 212-13 (emphasis added). 
47 Id. at 213; supra note 21. 
48 Id. 
6
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counsel.49  Further, while both majority decisions eschewed the pos-
sibility of a valid, legal reason having existed for the defendant’s ad-
journment request, Chief Judge Lipmann pointed out in his dissent 
that “the lengthy pendency of the prosecution was attributable to ad-
journments requested by both sides and there was . . . no apparent ur-
gency to try [a] matter . . . based on relatively recent allegations of 
misconduct said to have taken place years before.”50  It is clear, he 
added, that defendant’s request for a stay was not a dilatory tactic; the 
serious deterioration of Martineau’s health only two weeks prior to 
the start of trial was not something over which O’Daniel had any con-
trol.51  Finally, Chief Judge Lipmann—the lone dissenter—concluded 
that the trial court’s decision was not a constitutionally permissible 
alternative since it forced the defendant to trial forthwith with counsel 
he had not retained.52 
The rationale applied by the dissent, although lacking support, 
is grounded in fairness and precedent.  William O’Daniel was not, in 
fact, wasting the trial court’s time by causing unnecessary delays.  
Rather, he was subject not only to his chosen attorney’s poor health, 
but also to a ruling that rendered his fundamental right to choose vir-
tually worthless. 
III. THE QUALIFIED RIGHT TO CHOOSE 
Without question, the right to choice of counsel is qualified in 
many important respects.53  Because O’Daniel is not an indigent de-
fendant and does not require counsel to be appointed for him, that 
 
49 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 213. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 213-14. 
52 Id. at 214. 
53 Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988); see also United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 
140, 151-52 (2006) [hereinafter Gonzalez-Lopez 2]. 
[T]he right to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who re-
quire counsel to be appointed for them . . . [n]or may a defendant insist 
on representation by a person who is not a member of the bar, or demand 
that a court honor his waiver of conflict-free representation . . . [and] we 
have recognized a trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to 
counsel of choice against the needs of fairness, and against the demands 
of its calendar . . . [and] the court [sic] has, moreover, an ‘independent 
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical 
standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all 
who observe them. 
Id.  
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particular qualification will not be a subject of this Note.  And since 
no conflicts existed that might have precluded either Martineau or 
Bruno from litigating the case, that qualification is considered moot 
for the purposes of this paper as well.  This Note’s purpose is to ex-
amine the law governing adjournments made on the basis of the con-
stitutionally-granted right to choice of counsel, and whether William 
O’Daniel’s request was sufficiently reasonable.54 
A. The Federal Approach 
Similar to all criminal defendants in the various states, an in-
dividual charged with a crime in a federal court is entitled to the as-
sistance of counsel for his defense.55  When defendants are able to re-
tain their own counsel and do not ask that one be appointed, they 
must be given a fair opportunity and a reasonable time to secure 
counsel of their own choice, though they may not insist upon that 
right in such a way that impedes the orderly procedure in courts of 
justice.56  A profusion of case law exists in which federal courts have 
found constitutional violations when trial courts have denied continu-
ances that were sought by a defendant so that the retained attorney 
could try the case.57 
The facts of Releford v. United States are quite similar to the 
circumstances in which William O’Daniel found himself.  Defendant 
Releford’s retained attorney was hospitalized before the start of tri-
al.58  As the trial date neared, it became evident that the attorney, Mr. 
Kay, would not be out of the hospital quickly enough to be at trial.59  
At that point, a different attorney who shared office space with Kay 
filed an affidavit indicating Kay was in the hospital and that he was 
expected to be released within fifteen days.60  In an attempt to appoint 
new counsel to Releford, the court ordered Kay’s office-suitemate, 
Mr. Buckalew, to bring the defendant into court so that a pauper’s 
 
54 See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. 1978) (“What is a reasonable 
delay necessarily depends on all the surrounding facts and circumstances,” and there are 
many “factors to be considered in the balance . . . .”). 
55 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). 
56 Releford v. U.S., 288 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1961). 
57 Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
58 Releford, 288 F.2d.at 299. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
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oath could be signed and Buckalew could be appointed.61  The de-
fendant declined to sign, stating that he was not a pauper and also that 
he did not wish to have Buckalew serve as a substitute for his re-
tained counsel.62  At somewhat of an impasse, the court was not able 
to appoint or compensate Buckalew because the oath had not been 
signed by the defendant, yet the court went on to express that “under 
the circumstances it was necessary for Buckalew to accept the re-
sponsibility of defending Releford . . . because Buckalew and Kay 
shared offices . . . [and] he would have to look to Kay for his com-
pensation.”63  The court went on to tell Buckalew that its decision to 
appoint him was based on the fact he shared an office with Kay and 
knew something about the case—an assumption quickly disabused by 
Buckalew—though he did admit to both having the case for a week 
and discussing it with Releford.64  The trial went on as planned and 
Releford was convicted.65 
On appeal, Releford’s contention was that he was denied the 
right to counsel of his own choice, and that even though Buckalew’s 
defense was not ineffective,66 the error is reversible without a need to 
show any prejudice.67  Granting leave to appeal, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant, 
holding that “the proper alternative . . . was to inform Releford that 
the trial could not be that long delayed and that a continuance would 
be granted for such reasonable time as might be necessary for Rele-
ford to secure substitute counsel . . . .”68  The judgment by the lower 
court was then reversed and remanded with directions for a new tri-
al.69 
The facts of Releford are not all that distinguishable from 
 
61 Id. 
62 Releford, 288 F.2d at 299. 
63 Id. at 300. 
64 Id. at 300-01. 
65 Id. at 301. 
66 See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  Claims charging ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel must be evaluated under the two-prong standard set forth in Strick-
land v. Washington.  Under the first prong, a defendant must show that “counsel’s represen-
tation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”  Id. at 687-88.  The second prong 
necessitates displaying that the “actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney 
performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove preju-
dice.”  Id. at 693. 
67 Releford, 288 F.3d at 301. 
68 Id. at 301-02. 
69 Id. at 302. 
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what transpired in William O’Daniel’s case.  The court, in the interest 
of efficiency, appointed an unwanted attorney who tried a case under 
circumstances that gave rise to a genuine and reasonable concern re-
garding representation.  Buckalew—like Bruno—was able to compe-
tently advocate for his client, but the Ninth Circuit, unlike the County 
Court in O’Daniel’s case, correctly recognized that effective repre-
sentation does not vitiate the right to counsel of choice. 
Subsequently, in Gandy v. Alabama,70 the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit found that due process had been violated when 
the trial court denied a continuance and forced the defendant to trial 
with an attorney he had not retained.71  Refusing the defendant the 
right to choose his counsel, in the court’s view, rendered the trial 
“fundamentally unfair.”72 
Years later, in Linton v. Perini,73 defendant Linton appealed 
the denial of a writ of habeas corpus petition, claiming that he was 
denied, without sufficient reason, the right to go to trial with the 
counsel of his choosing.74  At arraignment in the Ohio Common Pleas 
Court,75 Mr. Linton was represented by his retained counsel, Mr. 
Fanelly, and pled not guilty.76  Subsequently, Fanelly requested that 
the trial date be set for early the next month, rather than ten days lat-
er, because he had other obligations and could not adequately prepare 
for trial.77  The trial judge declined to push back the trial date over 
defendant’s objections, at which point Fanelly withdrew as counsel.78  
Allowing the withdrawal, the court instructed Mr. Linton to retain a 
different attorney to defend him ten days later.79  That same day, the 
defendant told the court that he could not obtain counsel, which, in 
turn, caused the court to appoint Robert Bulford to represent him.80  
Bulford immediately filed for a continuance, claiming that he would 
need more than ten days to prepare for trial.81  The trial judge denied 
 
70 569 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978). 
71 Gandy, 569 F.2d at 1319. 
72 Id. at 1327. 
73 656 F.2d. 207 (6th Cir. 1981). 
74 Linton, 656 F.2d at 208. 
75 Linton was charged with five felony counts – four for rape and one for kidnapping.  Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Linton, 656 F.2d. at 208. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 4, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/10
2016 WHEN EFFICIENCY TRUMPS 861 
the motion, which was followed by another continuance request—
filed the morning on which the trial was set to begin, and this time in 
an attempt to allow defendant’s originally retained counsel, Mr. Fan-
elly, to resume his representation.82  After the denial of that request as 
well, the trial commenced the following week and, two days later, the 
jury came back with a verdict of guilty on four of the five charges.83 
Following the guilty verdict, the Ohio Court of Appeals af-
firmed the judgement and the Supreme Court of Ohio denied leave to 
appeal.84  Linton brought a habeas petition in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Ohio, which resulted in the 
Magistrate producing a detailed report recommending the dismissal 
of the petition.85  While the District Court Magistrate held that “the 
State had not met its burden of showing that the denial of the contin-
uance was reasonable” and that Linton “had established a denial of 
his constitutional right to be represented by counsel of his own 
choice,” he concluded that Linton “had not met his burden of estab-
lishing prejudice as a result of the trial court’s deprivation of his right 
to representation of counsel of his choice.”86  The District Court 
agreed and adopted the Magistrate’s recommendation, which led to 
an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit.87 
The Sixth Circuit, finding that the trial judge “acted unreason-
ably and arbitrarily,”88 explained: 
The right to choose one’s own counsel is an essential 
component of the Sixth Amendment because, were a 
defendant not provided the opportunity to select his 
own counsel at his own expense, substantial risk 
would arise that the basic trust between counsel and 
client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary system, 
would be undercut.  It is also true that a trial court, act-
ing in the name of calendar control, cannot arbitrarily 
 
82 Id.  Although the second request for a continuance was denied, the court had scheduling 
problems and pushed back the trial date an additional four days.  Linton, 656 F.2d at 208. 
83 Id.  Linton was sentenced to be incarcerated to between seven and twenty-five years.  
Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Linton, 656 F.2d at 208. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 212. 
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and unreasonably interfere with a client’s right to be 
represented by the attorney he has selected . . . .  This 
does not mean that a trial court cannot tightly control 
its own docket, or that its assignment of cases can be 
[unreasonably delayed] by defense counsel and de-
fendants.  A court must always keep control of its own 
docket, but in doing so it must be reasonable and con-
sider the constitutional right of a defendant to have re-
tained counsel of his choice.89 
The court went on to observe that “nothing in the record indi-
cate[d] that the requested continuance involved a scheme to delay the 
trial . . . [and that] there was no showing of inconvenience to the wit-
nesses, opposing counsel, or the court.”90  As such, the District 
Court’s decision was reversed and the case remanded for a new tri-
al.91 
Linton is comparable to O’Daniel because there was no indi-
cation in either case that the defendant’s objective was to delay the 
start of the trial.  In Linton, the defendant’s attorney was physically 
incapable of assisting his client at the start of trial, just as Martineau 
was physically incapable of representing O’Daniel at trial.  However, 
here, unlike the court in O’Daniel, when the court appointed an attor-
ney who filed two continuances on behalf of his client because of his 
desire to proceed with an attorney of his choice, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded the action was arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. 
1. What is Reasonable? 
The Linton opinion explains that the right to retain counsel of 
choice is subject to a standard of reasonableness when requesting de-
lays.92  A leading case on the somewhat elusive concern, United 
States v. Burton, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, offers some guidance in evaluating 
requests for a continuance: 
What is a reasonable delay necessarily depends on all 
 
89 Id. at 209 (emphasis added). 
90 Id. at 212. 
91 Linton, 656 F.2d at 212. 
92 Id. at 209. 
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the surrounding facts and circumstances.  Some of the 
factors to be considered in the balance include: the 
length of the requested delay; whether other continu-
ances have been requested and granted; the balanced 
convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, wit-
nesses, counsel and the court; whether the requested 
delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilato-
ry, purposeful or contrived; whether the defendant 
contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the 
request for a continuance; whether defendant has other 
competent counsel prepared to try the case, including 
the consideration of whether other counsel was re-
tained as lead or associate counsel; whether denying 
the continuance will result in an identifiable prejudice 
to defendant’s case, and if so, whether this prejudice is 
of a material or substantial nature; the complexity of 
the case; and other relevant factors which may appear 
in the context of any particular case.93 
The decision to grant a continuance is customarily completely 
at the discretion of the trial judge, and there are no mechanical tests 
which can decide whether a denial arbitrarily violates due process.94  
The conclusion of any examination must be based on the circum-
stances that exist in every case, especially those reasons available to 
the trial judge when the request is denied.95 
Notably, the Burton court included prejudice of a substantial 
or material nature when identifying the “appropriate subject of a trial 
court’s attention” where continuances are sought.96  Considering the 
great volume of appeals based on Sixth Amendment rights, this inex-
orably leads to the inquiry: by what standard do we evaluate claims 
alleging a violation of the constitutionally-granted right to retain 
counsel of one’s choosing?  After all, we have seen what happens as 
a result of Strickland’s prejudice prong97 needing to be satisfied.98  
 
93 Burton, 584 F.2d at 490-91. 
94 Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1694). 
95 Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. 
96 Burton, 584 F.2d at 490-91. 
97 See supra note 66. 
98 See Richard Klein, A Generation Later: The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1479 (1999) (focusing on the numerous decisions by 
which “the [Supreme] Court has led us down a path which has constitutionalized the inade-
13
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Fortunately we were given a great deal of direction by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez. 
2. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez 
i. Background 
In 2006, the Supreme Court heard United States v. Gonzalez-
Lopez and directly addressed the right to retain counsel of choice, re-
ferring to it as “the root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tee.99  Three years earlier, Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez was charged 
in the Eastern District of Missouri with conspiracy to distribute more 
than one hundred kilograms of marijuana.100  Upon his arrest his fam-
ily members hired an attorney, John Fahle, to represent him, and he 
eventually appeared at both the defendant’s detention hearing as well 
as his arraignment.101  After his arraignment, Gonzalez-Lopez hired 
Joseph Low, a California attorney, who appeared along with Fahle at 
an evidentiary hearing.102  Even though Low had not yet entered his 
appearance, the Magistrate accepted Low based on assertions that he 
intended to file a motion for admission pro hac vice.103  That provi-
sional acceptance would prove to be short-lived when the Magistrate 
rescinded it after Low passed a note to Fahle during cross-
examination in direct violation of a rule of the court.104  Next, on 
March 11, 2003, the defendant asked Fahle to stop representing him 
and told Low he wanted him to be his only attorney.105  Six days later 
Low filed for admission pro hac vice which was denied the next day 
without an explanation.106  Four weeks later, Low submitted a second 
motion for admission which was again denied without any explana-
tion.107  Two weeks subsequent Low filed a writ of mandamus in an 
 
quate, incompetent, ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
99 Gonzalez-Lopez 2, 548 U.S. at 147-48 (emphasis added). 
100 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 399 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Gon-
zalez-Lopez 1]. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 926-27. 
103 Id. at 927. 
104 Id. 
105 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 927. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
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attempt to compel the court to grant his motion for admission pro hac 
vice.108  The application was dismissed and, additionally, Low sub-
mitted a general application for admission to Missouri’s Eastern Dis-
trict, a motion that was not responded to until after the Gonzalez-
Lopez’s trial.109 
Simultaneous to Low’s applications, Fahle filed for a continu-
ance to withdraw as counsel and initiated a ‘show cause’ hearing 
seeking sanctions against Low.110  Fahle’s complaint regarding Low 
was based on Low’s having communicated with the defendant about 
the case even though Low knew Fahle was representing the defend-
ant.111  At the next hearing the court granted Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez two 
weeks to retain new counsel and pushed the trial date back more than 
one month.112 
The defendant then retained Karl Dickhaus, a St. Louis attor-
ney, as counsel, doing so through Low.113  Shortly after that, the dis-
trict court provided its reasons for denying Low admission pro hac 
vice.114  On July 7, 2013, the first day of trial, Low again made a mo-
tion for acceptance and was again denied.115  Dickhaus—far less ex-
perienced with criminal trials than Low—requested of the court that 
Low be allowed to sit with him during the trial.116  The court re-
sponded by forbidding contact between the two attorneys, and also 
between Low and Mr. Gonzalez-Lopez, throughout the course of the 
trial.117  In fact, there was a United States Marshal that sat between 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 927. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 927-28 (“In denying the motions . . . the Court considered Mr. Low's conduct 
before the Court in United States v. Serrano . . . .  The record in that proceeding indi-
cates that Mr. Low contacted a criminal defendant with pre-existing legal representation, in-
terfered with the criminal defendant's representation, and attempted to circumvent the 
Court's ruling on a continuance of the trial setting.  In the same order, the district court not-
ed: ‘Mr. Low has sought admission into this Court by every means available.  He has been 
denied admission pro hac vice because of allegations of ethical improprieties--the very im-
proprieties that are the subject of the motion for sanctions.”). 
115 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 928. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (The defendant was not able to meet with Low the day the trial started, during lunch 
or breaks, or after the trial finished for the day. Low was also denied access to a detention 
facility until a district court ordered permission.) Id.  
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Low and Dickhaus throughout the trial.118  Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-
Lopez was convicted by a jury of his peers on July 11, 2003.119 
ii. Holdings 
Although the Supreme Court subsequently decided the stand-
ard by which denial of counsel claims are to be judged, much is 
gained by examining closely the holding crafted by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.  Acknowledging plainly that 
the Sixth Amendment affords the qualified right to choose counsel 
when facing criminal charges, the court concluded that the lower 
court erred in denying Low’s pro hac vice application.120 
Invoking the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Ful-
minante,121 the Eighth Circuit explained that constitutional errors that 
occur during criminal proceedings necessarily fall into one of two 
classes of errors: those reflecting “structural defects” and those im-
plicating “trial errors.”122  ‘Trial error’ occurs when the case is being 
presented to a jury.123  It is subject to harmless error analysis because 
it may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence 
presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”124  ‘Structural defects,’ on the other 
hand, are so exceptionally harmful that they require automatic rever-
sal without consideration of whether error ensued as a direct result.125 
 
118 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 928. 
119 Id. 
120 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 926. 
121 Ariz. v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
122 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 932. 
123 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08; Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 37 GEO. L.J. 
ANN. CRIM. PROC. 805, 853-56 (2008) (“Trial errors that are subject 
to harmless error analysis . . . include: (1) certain grand jury procedural viola-
tions; (2) errors in examination of prospective jurors; (3) variances between the indictment 
before the grand jury and the proof offered at trial; (4) misjoinder of defendants or offens-
es; (5) failure to determine if the defendant understands the nature of charges; (6) failure to 
inquire whether a guilty plea is voluntary; (7) certain violations of a defendant's rights under 
the Fourth, Fifth, or Sixth Amendments; (8) the absence of the defendant from trial proceed-
ings; (9) juror misconduct; (10) prosecutorial misconduct; (11) improper exclusion of excul-
patory evidence; (12) errors in jury instructions; and (14) sentencing errors, including both 
constitutional and statutory Booker errors.”).  
124 Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08. 
125 Id. at 310; Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. CRIM. PROC. 805, 
857-60 (“Structural errors include: (1) denial of the right to a jury trial; (2) racial discrimina-
tion in jury or grand jury selection; (3) denial of the defendant's right to peremptory chal-
lenges; (4) improper removal of potential jurors for cause in capital trials; (5) improper 
16
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In Gonzalez-Lopez, the precise issue on which the Court of 
Appeals decided was “whether a solvent [non-indigent] defendant 
who is denied chosen counsel and who is not impeding the admin-
istration of justice, must show prejudice from this denial in order to 
obtain relief.”126  With an abundance of case law responding to that 
question in the negative,127 it was decided here also that the denial of 
the right to be represented by a chosen attorney results in an automat-
ic reversal of a given conviction.128  According to the opinion from 
the Eighth Circuit, utilizing harmless error analysis to decide such 
cases is improper, as its application effectively obliterates the Sixth 
Amendment right to be represented by counsel of choice by trans-
forming the right to choice of counsel into the right to have effective 
assistance of counsel.129 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision five 
votes to four, identifying a Sixth Amendment violation that required 
vacating the conviction and remanding the case for a new trial.130  In 
fact, the Court noted that it had “little trouble” concluding that un-
warranted deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with “conse-
quences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate,” plain-
ly constitutes structural error.131 
In its failed attempt to convince the Court, the Government 
contended that the Sixth Amendment violation was not complete un-
less the assistance received by substitute counsel was both deficient 
and prejudicial.132  The majority adroitly distinguished effective as-
 
amendment of the indictment; (6) denial of the right to counsel; (7) denial of the right to 
choice of counsel due to erroneous disqualification; (8) denial of the right to self-
representation at trial; (9) denial of the right to an impartial judge; (10) denial of the right to 
a public trial; (11) egregious violation of the right to a fair trial; (12) certain discovery viola-
tions; and (13) erroneous jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt.”). 
126 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 933. 
127 See Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 
693, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Bland v. California, 20 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 818 (1st Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 285-
86 (6th Cir. 1985). 
128 Gonzalez-Lopez 1, 399 F.3d at 933. 
129 Id. at 935. 
130 Gonzalez-Lopez 2, 548 U.S. at 152. 
131 Id. at 150.  “It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would 
have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the 
proceedings . . . .  Harmless-error analysis in such a context would be a speculative inquiry 
into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” Id. 
132 Id. at 144. 
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sistance and choice of counsel, stressing that the need to illustrate 
prejudice in claims charging ineffective assistance emanates from the 
very meaning of the right at issue; it is a matter of “showing that a 
violation of the right to effective representation occurred.”133  Alter-
natively, a “choice-of-counsel violation occurs whenever the defend-
ant’s choice is wrongfully denied.”134  In essence, the Government’s 
argument incorrectly read the Sixth Amendment “as a more detailed 
version of the Due Process Clause–and then proceeds to give no ef-
fect to the details.”135 
Gonzalez-Lopez demands that appellate courts treat depriva-
tion of choice claims as structural errors, and that the level of repre-
sentation received at trial—no matter how effective—is not relevant 
to the claim.  What this means is that, where abuse of discretion is 
present in the denial of a choice of counsel request, the case must be 
remanded for a new trial.  And so, whether William O’Daniel re-
ceived effective representation by Bruno, or even representation that 
could be qualitatively found to be superior to what he would have re-
ceived from his retained counsel, Martineau, the analysis must fall 
completely on the judge’s decision not to grant the adjournment. 
B. New York’s State of Choice   
The rights and protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution, 
when not required in a given state, are virtually meaningless.136  This 
precise concern brought about the eventual need for the incorporation 
doctrine and, through it, selective incorporation—the Supreme 
Court’s decisions regarding which aspects of the Bill of Rights 
should be applicable to the states as a matter of due process.137  Con-
sequently, the Sixth Amendment—as incorporated by the Fourteenth 
 
133 Id. at 150. 
134 Gonzalez-Lopez 2, 548 U.S. at 150. 
135 Id. at 145. 
136 William J. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 493 (1977). 
137 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 274 (1960); for a more in-depth explanation 
of the incorporation doctrine and its implications, see generally: Jerald H. Israel, Selective 
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO L.J. 253 (1982); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) 
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Amendment—demands that, in each state, “the trial court must bal-
ance the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel against the socie-
tal interest in the ‘prompt and efficient administration of justice.’”138 
By now it is certainly well established in New York that the 
right to counsel includes the qualified right to counsel of choice for a 
criminal defendant.139  In actuality, New York’s highest court has re-
liably construed the right to counsel provided by the New York Con-
stitution more broadly than the federal right to counsel has been in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court.140  Its stance on this matter is that 
courts ought to be cautious when interfering with an established at-
torney-client relationship.141  An individual’s right to select an attor-
ney, according to the New York Court of Appeals, implicates both 
First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment guarantees and should 
not yield “unless confronted with some overriding competing public 
interest.”142  New York courts have even acknowledged—expanding 
on the Supreme Court’s majority holding in Morris v. Slappy143—that 
the evolving relationship between a criminal defendant and his attor-
ney is of tangible import.144  In short, the highest binding jurispru-
dence has instructed the various courts of New York that each is “ob-
ligated to respect a party’s choice of trial counsel” and, in doing so, 
“not readily interfere with an attorney-client relationship.”145 
This is not to say, of course, that New York’s approach is so 
liberal that some absolute and unwavering right to choice of counsel 
exists.  Similar to the federal approach, an indigent defendant in New 
York is guaranteed the right to counsel, but the right to counsel of 
choice extends only to individuals who are financially able to retain 
their own counsel.146  Also, the same qualification to the right of 
 
138 Slappy, 461 U.S. at 16-17 (emphasis added). 
139 People v. Arroyave, 401 N.E.2d 393, 396 (N.Y. 1980); see N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
140 See Claudio v. Scully, 982 F.2d 798, 803 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[S]o valued is the right to 
counsel in this [New York] State, it has developed independent of its Federal counterpart. 
Thus, we have extended the protections afforded by our State Constitution beyond those of 
the Federal-well before certain Federal rights were recognized.”). 
141 People v. Hall, 387 N.E.2d 610, 611 (N.Y. 1979). 
142 Matter of Abrams, 465 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y. 1984). 
143 See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 14. (explaining that the Court of Appeals created a “new con-
stitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment” when finding that it “guarantees . . . a meaning-
ful attorney-client relationship.”). 
144 People v. Gomberg, 342 N.E.2d 550, 553 (N.Y. 1975). 
145 See Matter of Daniel C., 472 N.Y.S.2d 666, 675 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1984) (citing to 
decisions of the New York Court of Appeals—the highest court in the state of New York). 
146 People v. Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (N.Y. 1982); People v. Porto, 942 N.E.2d 
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choice applies when a conflict of interest exists.147  Although afford-
ing an absolute right to choice of counsel would be improper, what 
results when that right of choice has actually been denied in New 
York? 
1. Denial of Choice is Reversible Error 
New York courts remain watchful in their attempts to ensure 
that the right to counsel of choice is protected.148  In doing so, it has 
been held to be reversible error during circumstances in which “a 
court proceeds with the trial, the taking of a guilty plea, or sentencing 
in the absence of the defendant’s retained counsel, even though an at-
torney has been assigned to represent the defendant’s interests.”149 
In People v. Fitch,150 the Second Department’s Appellate Di-
vision held that substitution of assigned counsel in lieu of the defend-
ant’s absent retained counsel deprived the defendant of a substantial 
constitutional right.151  In People v. Gordon,152 the constitutional 
rights of the defendant were violated when, because of the absence of 
defendant’s retained counsel, the court assigned counsel to the de-
fendant when he was already represented by counsel of his own 
choosing.153  Similarly, in People v. Iacona,154 the court held that “the 
assignment of counsel was an improvident exercise of discretion 
 
283, 287 (N.Y. 2010) (“While a court has a duty to investigate complaints concerning coun-
sel, this is far from suggesting that an indigent's request that a court assign new counsel is to 
be granted casually.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
147 In People v. Jean-Baptiste, the Appellate Division, Second Department held that the 
defendant “was not deprived of his right to counsel of his choice . . . by the trial court’s deci-
sion to disqualify defense counsel . . . [when] defense counsel’s continued representation of 
the defendant would present a clear conflict of interest.” 858 N.Y.S.2d 388, 388-89 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 2008). 
148 Arroyave, 401 N.E.2d at 396. 
149 Id. (emphasis added). 
150 People v. Fitch, 269 N.Y.S.2d 521 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1966). 
151 Id. at 521. 
152 People v. Gordon, 30 N.Y.S.2d 625 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1941). 
153 Id. at 627.   
In our opinion the constitutional rights of the appellant were violated.  It 
was error for the learned County Judge to refuse to honor the legal en-
gagement of the defendant's attorney in the highest court of a sister State.  
The learned court committed further error by assigning counsel to defend 
the appellant at a time when he was represented by an attorney of his 
own choosing. 
Id.  
154 People v. Iacona, 254 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1964). 
20
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 4, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss4/10
2016 WHEN EFFICIENCY TRUMPS 871 
since the defendant was thereby deprived of the services of counsel 
theretofore retained by him.”155  And, in People v. DiSalvo,156 an as-
sociate from the office of the defendant’s retained counsel requested 
an adjournment based on the fact that the attorney was absent from 
the proceeding and could not be in court.157  In its holding, the Sec-
ond Department ruled that “the denial of the adjournment so as to en-
able counsel of the defendant’s choice to be present” deprived him of 
a substantial constitutional right.158 
Each of these cases, especially when read as clarifying the 
scope of what constitutes the denial of counsel, leads to the conclu-
sion that William O’Daniel’s conviction should have been reversed. 
Not only was his counsel substituted by the court in lieu of retained 
counsel, his retained attorney was physically incapable of being pre-
sent and he was forced to trial nevertheless.  It is curious that William 
O’Daniel can meet the bar of either holding’s concerns, and yet he 
remains without a new trial. 
As noted by each court, respectively, denial of the right of 
choice of counsel is a denial of a significant constitutional right.  In 
each New York case cited above (as with a myriad of others through-
out the development of this particular Sixth Amendment protection in 
New York and across the country), the decisions by the lower courts 
involved were “reversed on the law.”159  Conversely, many cases re-
garding the deprivation of counsel of choice in New York have been 
decided with very different outcomes, largely because the judgments 
made at trial were not eventually found to be abuses of discretion on 
appeal.160  The most relevant New York case regarding these con-
cerns and the efficient administration of criminal justice is People v. 
Arroyave. 
In Arroyave, the sole issue presented for determination was 
whether the denial of a motion requesting an adjournment for newly 
retained counsel to prepare for the trial deprived the defendant of his 
 
155 Id. at 360. 
156 People v. DiSalvo, 242 N.Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1963). 
157 Id. at 887.  Unlike in O’Daniel, however, the associate protested vigorously because he 
was completely unfamiliar with the facts of the case. Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Gordon, 30 N.Y.S.2d at 628; DiSalvo, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 886; Iacona, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 
360; Fitch, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 521. 
160 See generally People v. Milord, 981 N.Y.S.2d 453 (App Div. 2d Dep’t 2014); People 
v. Kearney, 806 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2005); People v. Teen, 561 N.Y.S.2d 94 
(App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1990). 
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right to be defended by his counsel of choice.161  Addressing the right 
to counsel of choice directly, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
the right of choice serves “many critical needs,” including the need 
for a given defendant to be “willing to confide freely and fully in his 
attorney so that the channels of communication and advice between 
counsel and his client may remain free-flowing and unobstructed.”162  
Such communication, the court opined, is “often times a critical pre-
requisite to effective legal representation [because] an atmosphere of 
trust and respect can best be obtained if a defendant’s choice of coun-
sel is honored.”163  What follows from this is that defendants are 
more likely to believe that their rights are scrupulously and diligently 
protected at trial, best effectuating the ultimate public concern at any 
criminal trial: “the need to discern the truth.”164  The court then 
delved into the fact that the right to choose is qualified to the extent 
that judicial proceedings may not be delayed if doing so prevents the 
efficient administration of criminal justice.165 
In its balanced analysis the court noted that “a myopic insist-
ence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for de-
lay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality,” 
proceeding to instruct that “it is equally true that . . . right . . . does 
not bestow upon a criminal defendant the absolute right to demand 
that his trial be delayed” because he or she has indicated a desire for a 
new attorney.166  Finally, the court instructed that a continuance 
should be granted largely at the discretion of the trial judge and that 
claims of denial of counsel of choice can only be assessed through 
examining the specific facts of each case.167 
Ultimately, Arroyave turned on whether the Department of 
Corrections obstructed the defendant’s attempts to secure counsel of 
 
161 Arroyave, 401 N.E.2d at 394. 
162 Id. at 396. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.; Arroyave, 401 N.E.2d at 396-97 (“In short, courts must remain sensitive to the 
benefits which both the defendant and the legal process itself derive from permitting the 
criminally accused to obtain counsel of his own choosing, and should undertake the steps 
reasonably required to ensure that the defendant's right to retain counsel is honored.”). 
165 Id. at 397.  (“The efficient administration of the criminal justice system is a critical 
concern to society as a whole, and unnecessary adjournments for the purpose of permitting a 
defendant to retain different counsel will disrupt court dockets, interfere with the right of 
other criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and inconvenience witnesses, jurors and opposing 
counsel.”). 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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his choosing.168  More than two decades prior to the decision in Gon-
zalez-Lopez, the New York Court of Appeals declined to accept the 
People’s contention that the defendant would be entitled to a new tri-
al only when he can establish prejudice resulting from the court’s re-
jection of an adjournment request.169  Rather, the correct approach is 
to ascertain whether the denial of the adjournment request was a 
proper exercise—or, alternatively, an abuse—of discretion by the tri-
al judge by examining the reasonableness of the decision in light of 
each of the existing circumstances.170 
An abuse of discretion occurs when a court fails to exercise 
legal, reasonable, and sound decision-making.171  As noted above, 
continuances should be granted largely at the discretion of a trial 
judge, which makes successfully proving an abuse of discretion a dif-
ficult task; however, the decisions throughout O’Daniel’s appeals 
process overwhelmingly reflected a preference for finality and effi-
ciency, and ignored the fact that he was forced to proceed to trial with 
the lawyer that he had not retained.172  As the Chief Judge of New 
York’s highest court concluded, there was “no doubt” that O’Daniel 
was invoking his constitutionally-granted right to be represented by 
counsel of his choice,173 the denial of which constituted a real failure 
to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making by the trial 
court. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
William O’Daniel was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right 
to proceed to trial with counsel of his choosing.  He and all defend-
ants similarly and unfairly denied their Sixth Amendment right to be 
represented by counsel of choice should be granted new trials.  With-
out question, many claims regarding the deprivation of this right have 
been frivolous and should be treated as such.  Take, for instance, 
People v. Howard,174 where the defendant claimed on appeal that the 
 
168 Id. at 395. 
169 Arroyave, 401 N.E.2d at 398. “The constitutional guarantee to be represented by coun-
sel of one's own choosing is a fundamental right, and the doctrine of harmless error is inap-
plicable upon a showing that such right has been abridged.” Id. 
170 Id. at 397. 
171 Abuse of Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
172 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 213-14. 
173 Id. at 212-213. 
174 People v. Howard, 988 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2014). 
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County Court committed an abuse of discretion when it denied a re-
quest for new counsel without additional inquiry.175  The Appellate 
Court responded by highlighting the fact that the defendant “pro-
claimed himself satisfied with defense counsel’s performance . . . and 
did not request new counsel until after moving to withdraw his guilty 
plea.”176  Likewise, in People v. Brown,177 the defendant complained 
that the court abused its discretion in denying an adjournment request 
in order for new counsel to be retained.178  Finding no merit in the de-
fendant’s arguments, the court found that the record revealed that the 
trial court “repeatedly accorded the defendant the reasonable oppor-
tunity to retain new counsel and . . . despite [that] . . . he failed to 
produce any other attorney of his choice to pursue his defense and re-
fused to proceed on his own behalf.”179  Certainly, there are innumer-
ous claims without the merit that existed in William O’Daniel’s 
claim.  Unfortunately, in O’Daniel, as Chief Judge Lippman’s dis-
senting analysis of the appeal recognized, “here, on facts establishing 
that defendant was, without compelling justification, forced to pro-
ceed to trial with an attorney other than the one he had retained, the 
majority denie[d] relief.”180 
Responding to any contention that O’Daniel was attempting 
to delay judicial proceedings, Lippman noted that “it is clear that de-
fendant’s request for a stay expressly to enable the exercise of the 
right to choose his lawyer, was not a dilatory tactic.”181  Unlike each 
of his counterparts on the Court of Appeals, and unlike each of his 
subordinate colleagues overseeing the courts below, the Chief Judge 
concluded that “there is no record support for the suggestion that . . . 
defendant was engaging in eleventh hour manipulation to prolong his 
period of release on bail.”182 
Addressing the true substance the choice being made by Wil-
liam O’Daniel, the dissent emphasized that Bruno had been retained 
by the defendant in the past to the extent that his decision to hire 
Martineau for such serious charges was a reflection of a considered 
 
175 Id. at 728. 
176 Id. 
177 People v. Brown, 521 N.Y.S.2d 61 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1987). 
178 Id. at 62-63. 
179 Id. at 62. 
180 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 212. 
181 Id. at 213 (emphasis added). 
182 Id. at 213-14. 
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preference.183  The trial court was bound to uphold that preference, 
absent some compelling reason to do otherwise.184  In this instance 
the trial court effectively obliterated O’Daniel’s constitutional right 
and, in doing so, caused the kind of structural error that has been re-
versed on the federal and state levels. 
Admittedly, the motion filed on behalf of O’Daniel is cause 
for consideration, given it is civil in its nature, but the defense put 
forth a valid argument for its consideration, an argument with which 
the Chief Judge agreed.185  The very language of New York’s own 
state constitution declares “[i]n any trial in any court whatever the 
party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and 
with counsel as in civil actions.”186  What follows logically is that 
when a stay is required in a civil action to afford representation by 
chosen counsel because of an attorney’s disability, the same must 
hold true in criminal proceedings.187  Even if that is not the case, ar-
guendo, the court was placed on “unequivocal notice that the defend-
ant was asking for an opportunity to decide for himself who would 
represent him at trial.”188  Regardless, when N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 321(c) 
and the New York State Constitution are read in conjunction with one 
another, the inescapable conclusion is that William O’Daniel should 
have been granted a stay, so as to effectuate his constitutionally-
granted right to proceed with counsel of choice.  In choosing not to 
recognize that this is the case, the New York courts have effectively 
quantified that which cannot be quantified and determined that which 
cannot be determined without any real, overriding competing public 
interest. 
It is only fair to acknowledge that the case was not in its in-
 
183 Id. at 213. 
184 Id. 
185 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 213.  
[O’Daniel] points out that article I, section 6 of the State Constitution 
provides that ‘In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall 
be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil 
actions’ (emphasis added). The argument is thus made that if a stay is 
required in civil actions to allow representation by counsel — which is to 
say by chosen counsel — when a defendant's attorney becomes disabled, 
the same rule must be applicable in criminal proceedings. 
Id. 
186 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
187 O’Daniel 2, 21 N.E.3d at 213. 
188 Id. 
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fancy;189 however, credit (or blame) for the lengthy pendency of the 
case was assignable to both sides which had requested adjournments, 
and “no apparent urgency to try the matter” existed since the some-
what recent charges were attributable to misconduct alleged to have 
occurred years prior.190 
V. CONCLUSION 
William O’Daniel’s retained counsel became unavailable 
through circumstances which were wholly out of his realm of control. 
Consequently, when the trial court proceeded to appoint and advance 
through the trial with counsel other than the lawyer retained and cho-
sen by Mr. O’Daniel, there was a substantive deprivation of his con-
stitutionally-granted Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. 
Was this an efficient choice on behalf of the criminal justice 
system?  Perhaps.  But that point becomes irrelevant when weighed 
against the fact that the choice was, when analyzed thoroughly, nei-
ther reasonable nor constitutionally permissible.  And, if efficiency 
does actually trump constitutional rights, the right to choose really 
can be just an empty formality after all. 
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